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3 Abstract
Abstract
Institutionalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is proceeding within 
the financial sector in many ways as a result of economic growth, rather than as a 
precursor or foundation of economic growth. This paper gives an overview of the archi-
tecture of financial governance in the GCC states, situating financial governance in the 
context of domestic state-building, global capital flows and energy markets. The paper 
argues that demand for new financial services often originates in the global business 
and finance communities, while domestic financial institutions dominated by state and 
ruling family interests may prefer less diversity and range (and requisite regulation). 
When GCC states do regulate markets, they are able to move quickly, which often priv-
ileges state priorities over market depth and diversification. As Gulf states create new 
economic institutions to govern their markets, they are also creating a framework that 
enables broader political goals of financial and economic statecraft.
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Council (GCC)
The author acknowledges financial support from the LSE Academic Collaboration 
with Arab Universities Programme (supported by the Emirates Foundation), as well 
as research assistance from Mai Mahmoud. Preliminary portions of this paper were 
published by the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, volume 16.2.
4 Markets Serving States: The Institutional Bases of Financial Governance in the Gulf Cooperation Council States
Introduction
Institutionalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is proceeding within 
the financial sector in many ways as a result of economic growth, rather than as a precur-
sor or foundation of economic growth. This paper gives an overview of the architecture 
of financial governance in the GCC states, situating financial governance in the con-
text of domestic state-building and shifts in global capital flows and energy markets. 
The paper argues that demand for new financial services often originates in the global 
business and finance communities, while domestic financial institutions dominated by 
state and ruling family interests may prefer less diversity and range (and requisite reg-
ulation). When GCC states do regulate markets, they are able to move quickly, often 
privileging state interests over market depth and diversification. The result is finan-
cial governance that varies widely across the GCC, reflecting disparate state strategies 
towards foreign ownership, foreign investment and economic openness and mobility 
within domestic populations (further delineating citizen and resident). Furthermore, 
the dynamic economic growth within GCC states in the last decade has created oppor-
tunities for new economic and financial statecraft, further merging state and domestic 
financial institutions’ objectives. After 2011, the wider Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region has felt the ripple effects of increasing GCC economic power, in inter-
vention by foreign direct investment (FDI) and state-directed aid packages. In this 
sense, the GCC states are simultaneously managing their financial sectors to maintain 
growth and competitiveness in global markets, while also reaping the benefits of a light 
regulatory framework with a significant presence of state-related financial institutions.
The paper proceeds in the following order: section 2 tracks the trajectories of eco-
nomic growth within the GCC states. It highlights two episodes of resource wealth 
windfalls, which have created conditions for the expansion of the financial sector, as 
well as investment opportunities in infrastructure and real estate in GCC national 
economies. These patterns of wealth generation and domestic investment tell us a 
lot about how states and state-connected interests (ruling families, state-owned enter-
prises) have managed and directed economic resources in line with political goals. 
Demographic challenges in the GCC are closely connected to the different ways in 
which states manage wealth and direct state resources towards citizens and residents.
Section 3 provides background on the evolving financial governance of GCC states. 
It underscores the lack of coordination in legal systems, despite GCC agreement to 
reconcile commercial codes and trade standards. GCC coordination (or lack of it) in 
trade mirrors the challenges the six states face in streamlining regional bank stan-
dards and financial services. Changes in international bank standards after the 2008 
financial crisis, particularly the Basel II Accords from the Bank for International Set-
tlements, prompted reform in many GCC states’ central banking oversight. However, 
central banks of the GCC still lack necessary instruments to gain access to informa-
tion in many bank and non-bank financial institutions. Relying on World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, as well as regionally based primary research, 
including interviews with legal experts and finance professionals, I find that there is a 
significant diversity in financial governance reform across the GCC. The variance in 
the strength and design of the regulatory state among GCC members is important, 
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reflecting normative preferences and learning experiences that have permeated insti-
tutional designs. For example, we see the strictest regulation of the finance sector in 
Saudi Arabia, where regulatory institutions have evolved in line with religious norms, 
as well as practical economic needs of the authoritarian state.
There remains a broad gap in standards for insolvency and restructuring proceedings, 
as well as the protection of rights of minority investors. Weakness in GCC financial 
governance is best understood as a pattern of ownership structure in financial archi-
tecture and a tendency to limit the availability of financial products. Points of friction 
are most evident in areas where the internationalization of finance is weak, in both 
rule-making and market-making. These friction points include not only intra-regional 
trade, but also the creation of both corporate and sovereign debt instruments, and 
standard tools of market regulation, such as credit bureaus and central bank oversight. 
The growing acceptance of corporate governance as a priority for both privately held 
and publicly held firms has created a limited space for collaborative reform, and more 
importantly ideational change, between state regulators and private sector actors.
Section 4 proposes an understanding of GCC states’ interventions in financial markets 
as efforts at economic statecraft, that is, efforts by states to influence other actors in the 
international system relying on fungible, economic resources (Baldwin 1985). As I have 
argued elsewhere, these interventions are relatively new (and underused before 2011) 
political tools for Gulf states, as their financial markets grow and become more sophis-
ticated and integrated into global capital flows (Young 2014). As a result of increased 
revenue from oil and gas exports in the 2000s, there have been new opportunities for 
domestic investment and economic development projects (i.e., state-building) in GCC 
states. Governance of windfalls reflects diverse state policy objectives. Within domestic 
governance of GCC states, there is a diversity of approaches to economic development 
policy as well. For example, inside the United Arab Emirates (UAE), strategies for 
growth vary between emirates, as does the ability to access federal oil revenue.
How states and markets are mutually constituted, how one attempts to stretch and limit 
the other, are key features of political economy. The equally important tensions and 
reverberations between domestic economic policy and foreign economic interventions 
are shaping GCC states’ abilities to affect the politics of their widening sphere of influ-
ence in the MENA region. It should not be a surprise that the thrust of FDI originating 
in the Gulf towards Egypt is concentrated in real estate and construction entities, many 
partially or fully owned by Gulf ruling families or state-owned investment funds.1 The 
GCC states have created sophisticated financial markets based on their own demands 
for financial intermediation. These demands have bases in social and religious norms, 
privileging real estate and tangible assets as equity, as a norm of Sharia-compliant 
investment. These patterns of financial intermediation, investment vehicles and pre-
ferred ventures are the first signs of outward-focused economic statecraft.
1  For example, consider the UAE construction firm Arabtec’s contract with the Egyptian army. See 
Al Sharif (2014).
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Efforts by the state, and its respective ruling families, to control or manipulate liber-
alization in the GCC directly impact some of the specific challenges of the sub-region, 
including generating private sector growth and employment opportunities for nation-
als, creating corporate governance regimes and practices, and expanding financial 
products and services across the population. This paper highlights some of the tensions 
between the regulatory state, non-state financial interests and sources of economic 
institutionalization, as well as some of the variance between GCC states in financial 
regulation. The result is not an exhaustive survey or a comprehensive theory of GCC 
financial governance or political economy; the paper does, however, present some 
compelling patterns of how state-building and market-making in the GCC are evolving.
Before tackling the puzzle of economic institutionalization and influence, we must 
understand Gulf states’ sources of wealth.
Trajectories of Economic Growth in the GCC: Energy 
Booms, Demographic Trends and Accumulated Wealth
Situated in a wider Middle East region riddled with poverty and political conflict, the 
GCC states boast impressive statistics in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) dis-
persed among very small citizen populations. Population growth in the GCC states is 
fast-paced, mostly driven by expatriate guest workers. There is a prevailing wisdom 
that the demographic ‘problem’ – meaning a minority citizen population among for-
eigners – of GCC states is increasing, but there is good evidence that the general 
balance of citizens to expatriates has been consistent, or slowly growing, in most GCC 
states since the late 1970s, with the exception of the UAE and Qatar (Baldwin-Edwards 
2011). States with over 50 per cent of populations as non-nationals have had persistent 
high levels of expatriate workers, while others, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia (KSA), 
have maintained levels under 30 per cent, underlining the cognizant governance of 
immigration levels. What has changed is the national origin of many expatriate work-
ers in the Gulf states. In the 1970s, most were Arab nationals. Today, most expatriate 
workers in the Gulf come from South Asia, mostly Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. 
According to John Chalcraft, reporting work by the Polish diplomat and early Gulf 
demographer Andrzej Kapiszewski (Kapiszewski 2006):
By 1985, the percentage of migrants in the GCC countries accounted for by 
Arabs had fallen to 56 per cent (from 72 per cent in 1975). Contrariwise, 
non-Arabs had constituted only 12 per cent of all workers in the Gulf in 1970, 
but by 1985 Asians comprised some 63 per cent of the Gulf workforce. (Chal-
craft 2010: 24)
The shift is a political decision and reveals how Gulf states have actively managed their 
populations to meet economic needs and to preserve political order.2 It is most heavily 
imbalanced towards non-citizens in two of the fastest-growing (in terms of GDP) GCC 
states: Qatar and the UAE.
2  On this point, see also Spiess (2010).
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In these two states, we also see dramatic changes in GDP in the resource/commodity 
boom of the mid-2000s. The general level of economic wealth and population size is 
shown in Figure 1, the demographic imbalance of citizens to expatriates in GCC states 
in Table 1, and the GDP growth among GCC states from the mid-1990s to the present 
in Figure 2.
These figures represent several trends in the global political economy of the last two 
decades. First, resource wealth has created new financial centres in the GCC, as recipi-
ents of foreign investment and sites of capital flows. Second, this wealth has generated 
feedback or reverberations in global and regional economies as it reacts to crisis and 
cycles. Just as the first petro-dollar phenomenon cycled through global financial mar-
kets through the 1970s and 1980s, the second petro-boom of the mid-2000s is creating 
similar disruptions. The petro-dollar deposits in international banks in the 1970s–1980s 
allowed a major expansion of credit by private banks to sovereigns, creating massive 
infrastructure spending and proliferation of national financial institutions across the 
developing (mostly oil-producing) world. 
Figure 1. GDP and Population for the MENA Region plus Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2013
Source: IMF (2014).
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Figure 1a. Oil Importers
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Table 1. Evolution of Foreign Component of Total Population in the GCC, 1975–2008 (%)
Source: Baldwin-Edwards (2011: 13).
Country 1975 1985 1997 2008
KSA 25 23 31 27
Kuwait 52 60 66 68
Bahrain 21 35 39 51
Oman 17 22 28 31
Qatar 59 60 67 87
UAE 70 79 76 81
Note: Data for 1975, 1985, 1997 from Kapiszewski (2001: Table 1.6); data for 2008 calculated from national datasets. 
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Figure 1b. Oil Exporters
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When interest rates rose in the United States by the mid-1980s, many states with new 
debt were not in stable fiscal positions to repay; hence, we saw a number of sovereign 
debt defaults and the seizing of international credit markets. There was not another 
‘emerging market’ boom until a decade later, the mid-1990s (mostly driven by equity 
markets, rather than debt). The 1980s became known as a lost decade in terms of eco-
nomic growth in the developing world. 
The ascent of oil and gas prices (and many other commodities) in the mid-2000s cre-
ated a new boom, which GCC states were able to harness. The two states positioned to 
capture this growth were the UAE and Qatar, states that were institutionally immature 
to capture the first petro-boom of the 1970s. See Figure 3, illustrating the rapid ascent 
of Emirati and Qatari GDP growth in the 2000s.
Interestingly, the GCC states have emerged relatively unscathed (economically) by the 
recent neighbouring wars in Syria and Iraq. A 2014 report by the United Nations cites 
the optimistic growth of GCC stock indices post-2011 compared to other regional 
exchanges, and argues that the greatest economic risk to the GCC states is a steep 
Figure 2. GDP Growth in GCC States, 1970–2014 (USD billion) 
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decline in oil prices, as occurred briefly after the 2008 financial crisis.3 We are experi-
encing this decline now and should expect to see repercussions in government fiscal 
balances, infrastructure and social spending declines. So-called ‘break-even’ estimates 
for fiscal expenditure and oil revenues for the Gulf states are one indication of the 
future policy options GCC states may have for using social expenditure as a release 
valve for domestic unrest.
There is little cause for (immediate) alarm, however, as most GCC states have very 
comfortable sovereign debt levels and reserves. See Figure 4 on oil-revenue and 
state-expenditure balancing; Figure 5 for the movement of oil prices in the last 
decade, explaining some of the growth surge moments within GCC economies; and 
Figure 6 on the IMF’s estimates of how increased government spending, particularly 
on salaries, may affect government fiscal balances in the coming years. State spending 
across the GCC on salaries and infrastructure has steadily increased since 2011. If the 
IMF projections hold for 2015–18, combined with further declines in oil revenues, 
we should expect to see deficit spending and a shift in fiscal policy in the sub-region. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that GCC states should have little trouble 
accessing sovereign debt markets, if they seek external financing. (The IMF report was 
released in October 2014, before oil prices declined sharply in late 2014, meaning that 
the projections could be best-case scenarios should the decline continue.)
The origin of wealth in the GCC states has been natural energy resources, but finan-
cial governance in these states has followed at least two restrictive patterns: one in 
monetary policy, the other in fiscal policy. The first is a preference for fixed exchange 
rates in the form of US-dollar-based pegs or currency baskets (in the case of Kuwait). 
3  See recent data from the UN to demonstrate this point, for example United Nations, DESA/
UNCTAD (2014: 134) .
Figure 3. Qatar and UAE GDP Ascent, 2004–14 (USD billion)
Source: Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/qatar/gdp; World Bank data.
500
400
300
200
100
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 20142012
Qatar GDP
(billions $USD)
UAE GDP
(billions $USD)
11  Trajectories of Economic Growth in the GCC
The second is a pattern of social relations in which citizens expect state subsidies and 
infrastructure spending to continue their steady rise since the 1970s, with little to zero 
personal income tax. Tax policy varies within the GCC, but most taxation is focused 
on corporates and banks.4 Corporate tax rates range from 10 per cent in the Qatar 
Financial Centre (free zone) to 20 per cent income tax on foreign partners/sharehold-
ers in Saudi Arabia. There are multiple employee-based tax schemes in Bahrain (paid 
by corporates/employers). Most taxes in the GCC come in the form of administrative 
fees to government ministries for licensing and registration (Hourani 2013).
4  For a legal presentation on GCC regulatory provisions, see Hourani (2013).
Figure 4. Break-even Prices among GCC Oil Producers, 2015
Source: IMF (2015).
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Figure 6. Change in GCC States’ Fiscal Balance, 2012–18 (% GDP)
Source: IMF (2014b: 23).
Figure 5. Oil Prices, 1968–2016 (USD)
Source: US Energy Information Agency (2015).
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The problem with these patterns is that GCC economies become highly sensitive to 
oil and gas prices and subsequent boom/bust cycles. During periods of high energy 
prices, government finances improve, which creates domestic liquidity (government 
money goes into the domestic banking system), and investor and lender confidence 
rises. This translates to higher asset prices, often most visible in real estate. As finan-
cial institutions have an incentive to keep lending, they also increase their exposure to 
risk, again, especially in the construction and real estate sectors. Because other finan-
cial instruments (e.g., corporate bonds, derivative products) are less common in GCC 
markets, and investors (both private and state-related) prefer on a normative basis 
more tangible and Sharia-compliant assets and opportunities, there are concentrated 
risks in the bank system. In October 2014, an IMF report presented at a meeting of 
GCC finance ministers and central bank governors underscored the cyclical nature 
of GCC economic growth and contraction-associated risk with oil-price fluctuations. 
State–society relations, specifically the prevalence of citizens in public sector employ-
ment, play a large part in the cycle of risk (IMF 2014b). As the IMF report argues:
With banks mostly lending to nationals, and nationals mostly working in the 
government sector, banks’ personal lending is importantly exposed to oil de-
velopments affecting government employment and wages. The average share 
of nationals employed in the public sector is over sixty per cent (and varies 
between thirty five per cent for Bahrain and eighty seven per cent for Qatar), 
while, on average, seventeen per cent of total employment is in the public 
sector. Oil revenues fuelling public sector wages and employment in turn fuels 
personal credit, increasing banks’ indirect exposure to the oil sector. (IMF 
2014b: 13)
When energy prices fall sharply, the cycle reverses, putting pressure on banks to call 
in loans (Arvai, Prasad and Katayama 2014: 9–11). Central banks have little ability to 
intervene in interest rates, as monetary policy is tied to the US Federal Reserve deci-
sions. For that reason, bank regulation and capital adequacy ratios (the standards of 
the Basel II Accords) become the primary form of financial regulation in many GCC 
states. Figure 7 summarizes parts of the cycle.
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Saudi Arabia, with zero capital controls and no central bank intervention in interest 
rates or central bank discount policy (on a normative basis to avoid enforcing interest 
payments within the kingdom), should be most vulnerable, in principle, to this cycle.5 
Saudi banks are also closely regulated to maintain high capital adequacy ratios, while 
secure in their ability to rely on the government for capitalization when needed. It is 
a bipolar regulatory regime of zero monetary policy with tight bank regulation and a 
moral hazard of expected state intervention in bank bailouts, if needed. (Not surpris-
ingly, no Saudi banks have failed since the 2008 crisis.) The Saudi regulatory regime, 
in the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), has shown flexibility as well. In 1955, 
SAMA financed a large tranche of government debt, though its 1952 charter prohib-
ited extending credit to the government. The 2008 crisis also showed SAMA’s ability 
to react quickly with an explicit deposit guarantee across the bank system. (Ramady 
2009: 237)
The 2008 financial crisis became a turning point, a critical juncture, in GCC states’ 
financial regulations. With limited fiscal and monetary solutions, much of the state 
intervention in the finance sector focused on central bank authority to regulate banks 
and assess risk in their portfolios, guarantee deposits and inject liquidity (from gov-
ernment reserves) into the bank system (Khamis and Senhadji 2010a). The terms 
of these reforms were based largely on external sources, namely the international 
5  Bank control laws in Saudi Arabia are passed by royal decree, starting in 1952 with the creation 
of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), with members appointed by the king for four-year 
terms. For a discussion of this regime, and the prohibition of interest inherent (but still vague) in 
financial regulation in the kingdom, see Ramady (2009).
Figure 7. Energy price and market effects in GCC states
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standards of the Basel II Accords from the Bank for International Settlements, a vol-
untary best-practice guide in international finance. The following section provides 
an overview of evolving financial governance in the GCC states, highlighting how 
increased oversight has come slowly, through the diffusion of international best prac-
tices adapted to maintain the growing profile of GCC financial centres.
Evolving Financial Governance
Market size matters, and comparatively, the GCC is still very small. According to anal-
ysis by Deutsche Bank, finance in the GCC is below 1 per cent of global assets (Kern 
2012). This is in juxtaposition with the enormous size of some of the GCC states’ 
sovereign wealth funds, which traditionally invest government resource wealth in 
international capital markets, outside of the region. (See Figure 8.)
But not all finance flows outwards. As Steffen Hertog has argued, average inflows of 
FDI in the GCC have been dramatically increasing since 2001, amounting to over 
USD30 billion. In the 1990s, FDI going into the GCC amounted to less than USD1 
billion (Hertog 2014: 7). A 2014 McKinsey & Co. study by James Manyika and Susan 
Lund affirmed these findings, arguing that FDI and financial flows are steadily increas-
ing in the GCC and wider MENA region, yet intra-regional trade is largely commodity 
based and lagging in the service sector and knowledge intensity. The UAE leads in 
attracting regional FDI: 
FDI … , both in and out of MENA countries, is also growing quickly. These 
flows have grown twenty two per cent per year since 2002, twice as fast as the 
world average. The region’s inflows of FDI were fifteen per cent higher than its 
outflows – but they were concentrated in just a handful of recipient countries. 
The UAE, Israel, Iraq, Morocco and Egypt together attracted almost eighty 
per cent of MENA’s total FDI inflows in 2012. (Manikya and Lund 2014: 1)
Figure 8. Sovereign Wealth Funds Originating in GCC States (USD billion)
Source: Snoj (2014).
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Economic integration within the GCC is occurring as an outcome of individual state 
efforts at liberalization and private sector competition for regional investment, not as 
a unified regulatory framework or shared policy goal. GCC states trade and service 
markets are not well integrated, though the private and public investment between 
GCC states is very strong.6 What this tells us is that GCC financial markets are inter-
dependent, and similarly constituted and designed, yet they are not supporting the 
kinds of growth in knowledge-connected goods and services that characterize dynamic 
growth in other industrialized countries. The difference is a reliance on commodity-fu-
elled growth and the patterns of investment and intermediation mentioned above. 
As Serhan Cevik and Katerina Teksoz put it more succinctly, ‘The absence of deep 
domestic capital markets and ties with governments are the main obstacles to further 
development’ (Cevik and Teksoz 2012: 9).
The connection between the bank sector and the diversity of financial services and prod-
ucts on offer is very important. Because bank ownership is concentrated and largely 
restricted to foreign entities across the GCC (with variations: in Bahrain with no restric-
tions, and in the UAE, where there is a restriction on the proportion of ownership, we 
yet see more foreign banks and individuals exercising right to ownership), we also find 
that bank assets tend to be concentrated in asset type, mostly in loans. According to a 
post-crisis IMF survey of the GCC bank sector, banks’ assets were mostly composed of 
traditional loans and Islamic finance products – as much as 50 per cent in Saudi Arabia 
and 71 per cent in the UAE. Securities, as a proportion of bank assets, were scarce, 
accounting for only 8 per cent of bank assets in Qatar and as much as 23 per cent in 
Saudi Arabia.7 A similar analysis of GCC bank assets found that only 1 per cent was held 
in equities or derivatives (Al-Hassan, Khamis and Oulidi 2010: 13). Except in Bahrain, 
all GCC states have limits on foreign ownership of banks. (See Table 2.)
6  For an early discussion of the post-2008 financial crisis effects on GCC states and their interdepen-
dence, see Rossi and Davis (2009).
7  See Al-Hassan, Khamis and Oulidi (2010: 13). Al-Hassan et al. also cite a survey by Bankscope 
noting the limits of bank sector assets, underlining the narrow holdings and arguably normative and 
legacy preferences of bank directors.
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Table 2. GCC Ownership Structure in the Bank Sector
Source: Al-Hassan et al. (2010: 8–13; Appendix III, Table 8, Table 11).
Ownership Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi 
Arabia
Qatar UAE
Foreign 
(limits)
None 49% 35% 40% 
non-GCC 
nationals
60% GCC 
nationals
49% 40% 
Government/
quasi-govern-
ment (sector)
* 13% 30% 35% ** 41.5% 
(of which 
10.3% 
is royal 
family 
direct)
Notes: *Total sector figure not available in source, but four of the largest banks in Bahrain have partial government or quasi-govern-
ment ownership. The most significant are the National Bank of Bahrain, 49 per cent held by government, and the Bank of Bahrain 
and Kuwait, jointly held 32 per cent by the Bahrain government and 48 per cent by the Kuwaiti government. **In Qatar, the large 
Qatar National Bank is 50 per cent government owned, and the smaller Al Khalij Commercial Bank is 18 per cent held by a qua-
si-government entity. Total figure not provided.
Financial intermediation has limits in the GCC because of regulatory preferences 
against foreign ownership, normative preferences for more straightforward asset-
backed finance, and concentrated bank ownership with state ties. Bank ownership in 
the GCC is not always linked to individual ruling family members, but it is consistently 
linked to public sector or government (or government-related entity) ownership. In 
authoritarian, family-ruled systems, the distinction between the family business and 
family members can be muddled. Al-Hassan et al. (2010: 8) argue that the variance 
within GCC states is broad, ranging from 13 per cent government ownership of banks 
in Kuwait to 30 per cent in Oman and 35 per cent in Saudi Arabia. Board membership, 
and by extension corporate governance, becomes an important indicator of influence.
Awareness of corporate governance in the bank sector and in any non-financial com-
mercial entity is now more widely accepted in GCC states, though implementation is 
varied and generally driven by private, rather than state, efforts at reform.8 Corporate 
governance is a trending topic in some reform circles, and also among elites who are 
using the diffusion of the international norm to achieve professional advancement at 
the individual level. In an interview with a leading Dubai state-owned entity executive, 
he described the pressure to ‘be on a board’, now seen by government leadership as 
part of CV-building as much as a practice shift in corporate governance to open board 
membership to more locals (non-royal family members).9 
8  For a general overview of the norm and efforts by private and public sector entities to enforce it, 
see Koldertsova (2011).
9  Author interviews, Dubai, February 2015.
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The project is nationalist as much as it is about economic opening and information 
sharing. Both are approached with some trepidation. Across the GCC, corporate 
governance codes have sometimes developed via state regulators (Saudi Arabia), but 
private actors have also played a significant role where they have a voice. Codes and 
guidelines in the region emerge as early as 2002 in Oman, and as recently as 2010 
in Qatar. Most corporate governance efforts in the GCC extend to specific guide-
lines for banks (with the exceptions of Oman and Qatar). The Saudi Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) refined its code for public companies in 2009 to name any corporate 
board member holding more than 5 per cent of the company as inappropriate to be 
named as an ‘independent’ board member (Koldertsova 225  :2011). (As mentioned 
previously, most large firms in Saudi Arabia are not listed companies and would not 
fall under this advice.)
Spearheading the corporate governance effort in the UAE has been Dr Nasser Saidi, 
who served in the quasi-state project Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) as 
chief economist from 2006 to 2012. In that time, with OECD support, he created a 
mechanism for corporate governance public dialogue through the Hawkamah Insti-
tute for Corporate Governance.10 The space of the DIFC, as an interlocutor between 
international high finance and the more local patterns of wealth distribution and 
investment through entities held by the ruling family and the creative city-building of 
Dubai’s Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid, made an ideal opportunity for norm diffusion 
and public relations manoeuvring. The result, up to 2015, is that board representa-
tion and optics (public perception of independence or at least some diversity within 
local elite circles) are prized, but the limited number of locally listed public companies 
remain tightly linked to local politics. Dubai is, in this case, exceptional in its engage-
ment with the issue, at least at the level of business community awareness. Yet across 
the GCC, any substantial change in regulation of corporate governance, in banks and 
across commercial entities, is limited in effect as the largest companies and banks 
remain either family-owned or concentrated in an ownership structure with significant 
public sector presence. The initiation of norm diffusion, particularly with frequent 
encouragement and intervention by international actors like the OECD and World 
Bank, signals a shift and at least a ruling interest in the outside perception of corporate 
governance as a feature of the ‘new’ markets of the Gulf.
10  Author interviews in DIFC, January 2015, February 2015. See also www.nassersaidi.com.
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Table 3. World Bank: Credit Indicators
Source: World Bank (2015b: Table 1).
What the getting credit indicators measure
Strength of legal rights index (0-12)
Rights of borrowers and lenders through collateral laws 
Protection of secured creditors’ rights through bankruptcy laws
Depth of credit information index (0-8)
Scope and accessibility of credit information distributed by credit bureaus and credit 
registries
Credit bureau coverage (% of adults)
Number of individuals and firms listed in largest private credit bureau as percentage 
of adult population
Credit registry coverage (% of adults)
Number of individuals and firms listed in public credit registry as percentage of 
adult population 
Governance of the financial sector includes rights for investors and shareholders, bank 
regulation, procedures and rights for creditors in insolvency and restructuring pro-
ceedings, and the regulation of stock markets and debt markets. A good measure of 
how these regulations function, the annual World Bank Doing Business survey provides 
evidence of rule-making in GCC finance. The report creates an index on credit with 
the following components: strength of legal rights, depth of credit information, credit 
bureau and registry coverage, as a percentage of the adult population, all listed in 
Table 3.
The 2015 report findings for the GCC states demonstrate that credit registries have 
improved and there are noted increases in the frequency of insolvency proceedings, 
yet legal rights of investors, access to firm financials, and the ease of ending insol-
vency and contract disputes are not consistent within the GCC, nor does the GCC lead 
the wider MENA region. For example, Saudi Arabia ranks behind Sudan in ease of 
resolving insolvency in the 2015 Doing Business report, while the UAE ranks just above 
Algeria (World Bank 2015: 86). These are the reforms and practices that corporates 
and investors, both national and foreign, seek. See Figures 9 and 10.
It is important to note, however, that while accessing credit (and credit information), 
resolving insolvency and enforcing contracts can be difficult, there is not a uniform size 
or capacity of financial markets in the GCC. Each state may require tailored reform 
to protect the kinds of credit, lending and investing its citizens and residents seek. In 
terms of stock markets, we see a deeper equity market in Saudi Arabia, with a volume 
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of trade similar to that of smaller European markets (though new issues are few).11 
However, in places like Qatar and Oman, equity markets are very underdeveloped, 
with little volume. Financial services also vary as a portion of economic activity within 
GCC states. In Bahrain, the financial sector contributes 18 per cent to the economy, 
with banking sector assets amounting to over double the GDP. Bahrain has had the 
largest retail banking sector in the region, while the UAE is second and growing. Bank 
sector assets in Oman account for only 4 per cent of GDP (Ayadi and de Groen 2013: 6).
Figure 9. World Bank: How Economies in the Arab World Rank on Ease of Resolving 
Insolvency 
Source: World Bank (2015a: 86).
Note: COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAP = East Asia Pacific.
11  Author interviews, Dubai, February 2015; Doha, December 2014, February 2015.
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The variance in financial sectors extends to government regulation. GCC bank sec-
tors are particularly vulnerable to concentrated risk, meaning that many of their loan 
portfolios are concentrated in certain sectors, such as real estate and construction. 
Different states have created different regulatory mechanisms to counter this risk and 
many reforms emerged after the 2008 financial crisis.12 GCC regulators and ministers 
of finance, along with the IMF, are acutely aware of this risk. 
Figure 10. World Bank: How Economies in the Arab World Rank on Ease of Enforcing 
Contracts 
Source: World Bank (2015a: 80).
12  On bank reform, see also Garbois and Bhatnagar (2013). On the issue of concentrated risk in the 
GCC bank sector, see IMF (2014b).
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In Saudi Arabia and Oman, for instance, banks are restricted in their categories of 
lending, and hence less than 10 per cent of loans are outstanding in the real estate 
sector (Ayadi and de Groen 2013: 7).
After 2009, the UAE regulators implemented deposit guarantees, central bank liquid-
ity support, capital injections (including the informal loan to the emirate of Dubai 
after the Dubai World debt standstill)13 and monetary easing (lowered interest rates) 
to deflect the effects of the crisis. Other policy responses varied considerably between 
GCC states. Because Qatari banks had lent heavily to the government, it purchased 
bank assets – the only GCC state to do so as a crisis response. Qatar did not, however, 
use policies of monetary easing, as every other GCC state did. Stock market purchases 
by states occurred only in Kuwait and Oman, though stock markets in Oman have very 
low volume (Khamis and Senhadji 2010a: 4). See Table 4 for a depiction of GCC policy 
responses to the 2008 financial crisis.
Table 4. GCC Policy Response to the Global Financial Crisis
Source: Khamis and Senhadji (2010a: 4).
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE
Deposit guarantee x x x
Central bank  
liquidity
x x x x x x
Long-term  
government deposits
x x x x x x
Capital injections x x x
Bank asset purchases x
Stock market  
purchases
x x
Monetary easing x x x x x
Likewise, capital adequacy standards (what banks hold in deposit relative to what they 
lend) are generally well above international benchmarks, the Basel II Accords, within 
the GCC. This is a central bank regulation and across the GCC the standards are 
high. On paper, there is little lending to governments from the private bank systems 
of the GCC. Among GCC states, Qatari banks are heaviest lenders to the government, 
focused on infrastructure projects. But in practice, the connectedness of firms in terms 
of ruling-family ownership, state-owned enterprises or related firms makes it difficult 
to gauge banks’ credit exposures to GCC governments. There is also a regional con-
centration in lending. The IMF has warned that GCC banks’ credit exposures to the 
GCC and other Arab countries is between 75 and 100 per cent for four of the GCC 
countries, with the UAE and Bahrain showing less concentration in the region (though 
still around 50 per cent in both cases) (IMF 2014b: 13).
13  See Young (2014: ch. 3) for further detail on the Dubai World debt restructuring.
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The measurement of non-performing loans is also opaque in many GCC environ-
ments. After the 2008 crisis, many GCC governments made major liquidity injections 
into local bank systems. If reported non-performing loans are so low, then the level of 
liquidity injection seems extreme.14 (At the individual level, there is the precedent of 
GCC state-sanctioned personal loan forgiveness programmes in Kuwait in 1991 and 
2013, and also recently in the UAE.15) After these policy responses to the financial 
crisis, non-performing loans as a proportion of total loans have also decreased in every 
GCC country except for the UAE and Bahrain. While the increase in non-performing 
loans in Bahrain is not significant, that in the UAE reflects the problems in the coun-
try’s real estate sector (Ayadi and de Groen 2013: 10).
The legal framework dealing with bankruptcy and liquidation is dated across the GCC, 
with limited exceptions. Kuwait is the only country to have reformed the framework 
since the financial crisis, with most basic commercial law of the region dating to the 
early 1930s (Markaz Research 2013). Another exception is Decree 57 of the DIFC, 
but that decree holds for the restructuring of only one corporate entity, namely Dubai 
World. The court system within the DIFC was established to deal with disputes among 
parties registered in the free zone, using US and UK commercial law. After the Dubai 
financial crisis, the ability to use the DIFC court system was extended by decree to any 
parties in dispute in the emirate of Dubai who agreed to move their process into the 
system. The flexibility of a decree-based legal entity allows the emirate of Dubai to 
shift as financial norms and crises demand. The DIFC is a regulator of non-deposit, 
non-retail banks. The UAE Central Bank has authority over all deposit banks in the 
country. The bankruptcy of a DIFC financial institution would be a contractual matter, 
rather than one requiring a federal lender of last resort or central bank to intervene. 
For example, if an asset management firm were to fail in the DIFC, there would be 
the contract between parties accepting risk, with courts in either the DIFC or a foreign 
jurisdiction hearing the dispute. In the event of a dispute involving fraud or criminal 
activity among DIFC registered parties, the UAE criminal courts would have jurisdic-
tion.16 See Table 5 for a view of bankruptcy and liquidation laws across the GCC.
In contrast to the pace of reform in insolvency, there is rapid growth of a select type 
of financial intermediation and product in the GCC: Islamic finance. The popularity 
of the Islamic bond, or sukuk, has revitalized the banking industry across the region 
since the financial crisis. It has also created a new market of advisory services for for-
eign firms operating as issuers, advisors and legal support on these asset-backed debt 
instruments. The challenge in the growth of the sukuk market is that it also remains 
relatively untested in insolvency proceedings. Though a sukuk may have real estate as 
collateral, that asset is not always easily divided or liquidated.17
14  For a detailed account of post-crisis responses by GCC states in national bank systems, see Khamis 
and Senhadji (2010b). The authors do not make this point explicitly, but they do indicate the differ-
ence in public disclosure of non-performing loans and government policy responses in bank liquidity 
support across the GCC.
15  Westall (2013). See also Arabian Business (2012).
16  Author interviews with legal and banking experts, DIFC, January 2015; London, March 2015.
17 See, for example, the problem of using undersea or reclaimed land as collateral in a debt 
restructuring by Nakheel, the Dubai government-backed property developer. Nakheel successfully 
restructured much of its debt between 2010 and 2014, but many of the debt instruments were innova-
tive and untested at the time. Author interviews, Dubai and London, February 2015. See also Bianchi 
and El Baltaji (2011).
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Table 5. Bankruptcy and Liquidation Legal Framework in the GCC
Source: Markaz Research (2013). 
Country Law dealing with liquidation and  
bankruptcy
Chapter/
Article
Date of  
promulgation
KSA a) Commercial Court law 
b) Bankruptcy Preventive Settlement Law 
a) June 1930
b) January 1996
UAE Commercial Law, Federal Law No. 18 Book 5 1993
Qatar a) Commercial Law No. 27
b) QFC Insolvency Regulations 
a) 2006
b) 2005
Kuwait Companies Law No. 25 Articles 
297–326
2012
Bahrain Bankruptcy and Composition law 1987
Oman Commercial law Book 5, 
chs 1–4
1990
Ownership structure in financial intermediation is extremely important and tends to 
be concentrated across MENA states. While the number of stock exchanges has been 
increasing, the use of these platforms remains somewhat limited in both volume and 
listings. As an OECD report notes, across the region (with perhaps the exception of 
Jordan), in Bahrain, Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, the largest twenty companies in each country are not listed on the local stock 
exchanges.18 In Saudi Arabia there are only two large companies listed; in Kuwait only 
three; and in Oman only two. The Saudi, Kuwaiti and Omani corporate sectors are dom-
inated by private, family-owned businesses and state-owned enterprises. In the UAE, 
most of the largest corporations are state-owned, are not listed (e.g., Abu Dhabi Invest-
ment Authority, Dubai Holding) or are family-owned (e.g., Al Fardan Exchange and 
Finance, Al-Taweelah, Habtoor.) In contrast, Bahrain’s largest companies do tend to be 
publicly listed (even with partial government ownership) and they are mostly finance-re-
lated (e.g., National Bank of Bahrain, Al-Ahli Bank, Taib Bank and Investcorp SA).
The differences across the GCC states in practices in financial services and ownership 
structures, including government or ruling-family ties and foreign ownership, portray 
a spectrum of views on liberalization and financial governance. The Bahraini case is 
interesting for its openness to foreign ownership, yet still with a strong state presence 
in bank ownership competing alongside many others. In the Saudi case, we see a more 
regulated (or coddled) bank sector and limited financial product offering, while what 
little is offered on exchange platforms is more actively traded. Given the opportunity, 
one would expect the Saudi financial sector might grow very quickly, necessitating an 
18  See, for example, OECD (n.d.). This is a growing area of empirical research on the political econ-
omy of the region, though data collection remains difficult.
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expansion of state legal oversight and possibly creating a direct conflict between the 
goal of economic growth and the state priority of following Islamic law. It is in the 
UAE, the state with the most liberal approach to free zones and financial centres with 
experimental legal systems, that the heaviest presence of the state and ruling families 
is evident. These findings are somewhat counterintuitive, until we consider the pre-
vailing shared wisdom of ruling Gulf monarchies: markets exist for state and family 
survival and wealth strategies.
Political Targets of Economic Growth: GCC Economic and 
Financial Statecraft
Using economic resources for political ends is economic statecraft. These resources are 
not just cash injections or FDI, but any resource that has a ‘reasonable semblance of a 
market price in terms of money’, following David Baldwin’s definition (Baldwin 1985: 
13). All kinds of transactions, aid, logistical support in emergencies, as well as punitive 
acts like sanctions, are possible mechanisms of economic statecraft. Financial state-
craft, as Benn Steil defines it, is ‘aspects of economic statecraft directed at influencing 
capital flows’ (Steil 2008: 3). Table 6 illustrates the differences between economic and 
financial statecraft. GCC states are engaged in a standoff of sorts in financial statecraft, 
in their competition to attract regional FDI to their parallel free zones and financial 
centres, and in their competition to place FDI (and aid) in the wider MENA region.
The GCC proposes a currency union, but progress has stalled for the last several years. 
In practice, however, the states are already in a union of sorts because of their shared 
monetary policies tied to the US dollar. This restriction on currency manipulation has 
led the states to compete fiercely on attracting capital flows, while a focus on intra-re-
gional trade has been more modest. Emulating free zones in Doha, Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai are an excellent example of competitive financial statecraft between the GCC 
states. After 2011, we see a hybrid economic and financial statecraft emerging from 
the GCC towards the wider MENA region, in the form of foreign aid, debt forgiveness, 
hard currency deposits to shore up central banks, and a plethora of financial sanctions 
on both individuals and political groups from national bank systems.19
 
19  One example of the use of financial sanctions by GCC states includes the changing stance towards 
Hezbollah after 2013, though implementation of these sanctions remains unclear. National political 
movements, and individuals associated with civil society groups linked to religious political parties 
(e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood), have also experienced this kind of financial and security state tar-
geting. See Al Arabiya (2013).
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Table 6. Economic and Financial Statecraft
Source: Steil (2008: 4).
Economic statecraft Financial statecraft
Trade privileges, tariffs, quotas Capital flow guarantees and restric-
tions
Trade sanctions Financial sanctions on non-state 
actors
Foreign aid Underwriting foreign debt in cur-
rency crisis; (liquidity injections in 
foreign banks)*
Regional trade agreements Currency unions/dollarization
Note: * Author addition.
Figure 11. Financial Assistance to Oil-Importing MENA States, 2010–13 (% GDP) 
Source: IMF (2014a: 37).
Note: IFIs = International financial institutions.
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The GCC is emerging as the dominant source of financial assistance to oil-importing 
MENA states, in either loans, aid or central bank deposits, as Figure 11 shows. This is 
a rebalancing of the regional order, particularly lessening the leverage of international 
financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, and of traditional power brokers, 
that is, the United States and Russia. In the case of Egypt, the acceptance and return of 
aid and loans have demonstrated the intra-GCC competition for influence in domestic 
politics.20 Confident that other GCC countries would continue to provide help, Egypt 
returned USD2 billion in a soft loan to Qatar after the counter-revolution bringing 
General Sisi to power in 2013.
5. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that financial governance within the GCC is 
varied, as are market size and depth among Gulf states. The structure of ownership in 
much of the finance sector, specifically in bank sectors with a heavy state or ruling-fam-
ily controlling presence, has created a mismatch in demand for protection of creditor 
and borrower rights. While there have been reforms in creating better information 
flows about borrowers in new credit bureaus and registries, laws protecting the rights 
of investors and shareholders are still few. Differences in policy approaches to finan-
cial crisis are clearly evident and in line with the composition of risk in different GCC 
markets. More importantly, situating financial governance in the context of domestic 
state-building and shifts in global capital flows and energy markets reveals why GCC 
states are vulnerable to boom/bust cycles. The dynamic economic growth within GCC 
states in the last decade has created opportunities for new economic and financial 
statecraft, further merging state and domestic financial institutions’ objectives. We see 
this shift explicitly after 2011, when the GCC states actively engaged financial and eco-
nomic statecraft towards a widening sphere of influence in the MENA region.
20  The most visible example has been GCC aid to Egypt since 2013. See Arabian Business (2013).
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